Introduction

In the case of Hornsby v. Hornsby, Fred has appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny his request for a reduction in child support. Specifically, Fred argues that the chancellor erred in three ways: by excluding facts or evidence that could have been presented in litigation leading up to the October 2018 judgment on child support, by considering his “access to credit” in denying his request for a reduction, and by considering purchases or expenditures by him and his new wife as evidence of his ability to pay child support.

The discretion of the Chancellor in awarding child support

It is important to note that the award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor and will not be reversed unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his finding of fact or manifestly abused his discretion. This is as per Williams v. Williams, 264 So. 3d 722, 726-27 (¶12) (Miss. 2019). Furthermore, the process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support is essentially an exercise in fact-finding, which customarily significantly restrains the Court’s review.

The legal duty of parents towards child support

The underlying principle regarding child support is the legal duty owed by the parents to the child for the child’s maintenance and best interests. This is as per Adams v. Adams, 467 So. 2d 211, 215 (Miss. 1985). Although child support payments are made to the custodial parent, the payments are for the benefit of the child. Our law requires each spouse to “provide financially for his or her children, given his or her resources and opportunities.” This is as per Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So. 2d 839, 845 (Miss. 1990).

Modifying child support

A chancellor may modify child support if there has been “a substantial or material change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties . . . arising subsequent to the entry of the decree to be modified.” This is as per Edmonds v. Edmonds, 935 So. 2d 980, 987 (¶19) (Miss. 2006). The change must be one that could not have been “reasonably anticipated” at the time of the prior support order. This is as per Poole v. Poole, 701 So. 2d 813, 818 (¶19) (Miss. 1997). The change also must be one that materially affects the moving party’s ability to meet his child support obligations. The court may consider the parties’ respective financial conditions and earning capacities in determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred. This is as per Bailey v. Bailey, 724 So. 2d 335, 337 (¶7) (Miss. 1998). The party requesting a modification bears the burden of proving that there has been a material change in circumstances since the prior support order. This is as per Stephens v. Stephens, 328 So. 3d 760, 767 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).

Fred’s argument on exclusion of evidence

Fred’s first argument is that the chancellor’s in limine ruling excluding “[a]ny testimony or evidence regarding events, facts, documents, or other allegations that . . . were or could have been raised” prior to the 2018 support order was in error. Fred argues that this ruling prevented him from establishing a baseline against which to measure his alleged loss of income, and that it also prevented him from introducing his 2018 tax returns. However, it is important to note that Fred’s 2017 and 2018 tax returns were admitted into evidence, Fred’s law partner testified in detail regarding their firm’s financial performance in in 2017 and 2018, and the chancellor considered this evidence in his final ruling.  Moreover, Fred fails to identify any specific evidence that was excluded as a result of the chancellor’s in limine ruling.

Fred’s Appeal for Reduction in Child Support

In the case of Hornsby v. Hornsby, Fred has appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny his request for a reduction in child support. In his second sub-argument, Fred claims that the chancellor erred by considering his “access to credit and cash flow” when denying his request for a reduction in child support. Indeed, Fred argues that the chancellor made this access “the main factor in deciding NOT to reduce [Fred’s] child support.” In his third sub-argument, Fred makes a related claim that the chancellor erred by citing joint purchases by Fred and his current wife as evidence of Fred’s continued ability to pay. However, we disagree with Fred’s claim.

Relevant Factors in Modifying Child Support

The chancellor’s order methodically analyzes all ten factors that Adams, 467 So. 2d at 215, identifies as potentially relevant to a request to modify child support. The chancellor found that Fred’s income as a self-employed attorney in a two-lawyer firm was “more likely to fluctuate than [Burgundy’s income],” although Fred also received a salary for his position as a municipal prosecutor, National Guard pay, and rental income. The chancellor noted Fred’s access to credit primarily in connection with his fluctuating income from his private law practice. But the chancellor’s primary point was that despite Fred’s claim of a significant reduction in income, Fred failed to show any “corresponding reduction in his standard of living.” The chancellor noted that Fred and his current wife had built a new waterfront home on the Back Bay in Biloxi, had recently purchased a new BMW, and generally continued to enjoy an “upscale lifestyle.”

Insufficient Evidence for Reduction in Income

The chancellor also found that although Fred presented evidence that he earned less from his private law practice in 2018 than he had in 2017, he did not prepare or file his 2019 tax returns prior to the conclusion of the trial in June 2020. The chancellor ultimately found that Fred had presented insufficient evidence that he had experienced a substantial reduction in income rising to the level of a material change in circumstances since the prior order on child support.

Fred’s Appeal for Attorney’s Fees

In the case of Fred v. Fred, Fred has appealed the chancellor’s decision to award Burgundy attorney’s fees related to his petition for contempt. The chancellor found that Burgundy had incurred total attorney’s fees of $29,875.39 defending the present action, including Fred’s requests for modification. Burgundy had borrowed from her brother and sold assets in order to pay $17,618 of that amount, with the balance still owing.

Reviewing the Award of Sanctions

This Court reviews a trial judge’s award of sanctions under Rule 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act for abuse of discretion. In the absence of a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors, the judgment of the court’s imposition of sanctions will be affirmed.

Vexatious and Harassing Conduct

The chancellor found that Burgundy was entitled to an award of fees under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act because Fred’s contempt petition was “vexatious, without substantial justification, and filed for the purpose of harassment against Burgundy.” Fred’s contempt petition ultimately turned on factual disputes and essentially, the chancellor found that Fred had falsely accused Burgundy of refusing to communicate with him and refusing to reimburse him for travel expenses.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the chancellor did not manifestly err or abuse his discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to Burgundy as a sanction for Fred’s vexatious and harassing conduct during the litigation. Fred’s accusations were found to be without merit and his behavior suggested a purpose of harassment throughout the litigation process. The chancellor’s decision to award attorney’s fees to Burgundy is supported by the evidence and the relevant laws.